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Capital structure has proved to be a perennial puzzle in finance. If capital market imperfections 
through informational asymmetries and agency problems are present in the lender - borrower 
relationship the financial and investment decisions of the farmer are simultaneous and financial 
decisions affect the growth and investment opportunities potentially imposing a trade- off between 
production efficiency and financial structure. Supportive, although scant, evidence exists for the 
presence of capital market imperfection as well as the coherent impact on agricultural investment in 
the U.S. (Hubbard & Kashyap; Ahrendsen, Collender & Dixon; Bierlen & Featherstone) as well as 
abroad (Phimister). Recent results by Nasr, Barry and Ellinger provide evidence of a lack of 
separation between financing and production using agency cost, free cash flow and credit evaluation 
concept explanations. Barry, Bierlen and Sotomayor concluded also recently that measuring the gap 
between a firm’s cost of equity and debt arising from capital market imperfections is hampered by 
absence of  relevant data. 
Recent developments on informational asymmetries and investment have also, however, 
focused on the effect of financial constraints and internal cash flow variables without an explicit 
modeling. A standard approach to analyze the impact of asymmetric information is to either restrict 
the amount of debt in relation to an imposed constraint or to separate firms into different classes 
depending on an a priori assumption of the degree of informational asymmetry. A problem with 
such approaches is that the economic interpretation of statistical tests is blurred since financial 
constraints are imposed exogenously, and since the endogenous variables, which are used to 
parameterize the associated multipliers, are not explicitly accounted for when specifying the 
econometric model (Chirinko; Hansen).   This paper addresses these concerns in two parts. First, the interdependence of finance and 
investment is explicitly modeled by using Euler equations of a structural model of investment 
assuming that funds are chosen with the overall objective as to maximize the rationally expected 
present value of net worth for a homogenous technology. Informational asymmetries and agency 
problems are modeled as a reduction in output, thus capturing both price- and non-price responses. 
A convex financial adjustment cost function attributable to asymmetric information and agency 
problem is introduced. The presence of such a cost function is shown to be sufficient to establish an 
internal financial optimum without the use of exogenous borrowing constraints since it fills the gap 
between a firm’s costs of internal and external funds. The first part of the paper thus contributes to 
the literature by providing a theory for an endogenous determined capital structure in the presence of 
asymmetric information and its associated relation to agricultural investment. 
  Endogenous cost functions attributable to information asymmetries has been used previously 
in the theoretical literature (Kannianien and Södersten) as well as in the empirical literature 
(Hansen; Benjamin and Phimister) to explain the interdependent investment and financial decision. 
Kannianen & Södersten modeled costs of monitoring positively dependent on the stock of capital 
and negatively related to the firm’s indebtedness. Our cost function for agency problems and 
information asymmetries has the reversed properties. We propose that these costs are mitigated by 
the existence of capital and non-farm wealth when used as collateral and increased by debt because 
of costly state verification and adverse selection problems potentially related to higher levels of 
indebtedness. Benjamin and Phimister invoked implicit and explicit transaction costs that increases 
linearly with the level of borrowing. 
Second, the Euler equations for investment and finance are estimated using the generalized 
method of moments (GMM) technique (Arellano and Bond) on an unbalanced panel data set from 193 farm operations in Southwestern Minnesota for the 1989-1998 period. This part of the analysis 
will concentrate on the interdependence of investment and financial adjustment costs to increase the 
understanding on how fluctuations in investment are attributable to changes in financial decisions. 
The empirical results support our theoretical model. 
 
Modeling the investment and financial decision. 
Analyzing the investment and financial decision begins with a value of the farm enterprise. The 
farm operator is assumed to maximize the net worth  s V  of the productive enterprise when 
evaluating prospective investments over an infinite period. It is also assumed that the operator 
recognizes that the yield of an investment in any particular asset of the agricultural firm has to be the 
same as the yields of alternative investments outside the agricultural sector, taking into account 
discrepancies in tax treatment. For the farm operator to be content in investing in the agricultural 
firm it must therefore hold for firm i at time t that: 
() [] 1 1 −= + − + it
e
it it it t it it VR V V , , ,, , , τ ρ E          ( 1 )  
where ρ  is the nominal opportunity rate of return on equity required by the farm operator,  e τ  is the 
effective marginal tax rate on equity, R is net receipts from the productive enterprise (i.e. 
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where  () () iu iu r , , β =+ 11 with  () iu it
e
it r , , , =− 1 τ ρ  denote the one period discount factor.  t E  is the 
expectation operator. (2) rest on assumptions closely related to the Hubbard and Kashyap study. Risk aversion is not accounted for since future markets and/or long-terms contracts are available to 
risk-averse farm operators. In addition, the poor diversification in net worth corresponds to the 
capital market imperfection, which the model is used to analyze. The farm operator maximizes (2) 
subject to two constraints. 
The first constraint is the standard capital stock identity. Let δ  denote the rate of capacity 
depreciation at an exponential declining base attributable to the capital stock, then 
() is is is KI K ,, , =− − − 1 1 δ            ( 3 )  
where K is the capital stock and I is gross investment. 
The second constraint to (2) represents the net receipts from the productive enterprise. Net 
receipts are the residual after taxes, payments to variable inputs, debt service, net change in external 
funds and investment. Then 
( ) ( ) ( ) I P B B B z L w Y P R s i s i K s i s i s i s i s i s i s i s i s i p s i s i , , , , 1 , , 1 , , , , , , , , , 1 1 Γ − − − + − − − = − − τ     (4) 
where  is Y ,  is the output function and P s i p , ,  is the output price,  L w   and    is vectors of prices and 
quantities of costlessly adjustable inputs, respectively.  z s i,  is the nominal cost of external funds. 
Γ s i,  is the present value of fiscal allowances per dollar of investment and P s i K , , is the price of capital 
goods so that the last term in (4) equals the effective cost of investment.  is B ,  is the amount of 
outstanding debt (one-period loans) at time s. Net receipts are not restricted to be non-negative. 
  The output function in (4) includes physical output through the technology  [] is is is FKL ,,, , , 
costs of adjusting the capital stock  is G , as well as costs related to adjusting outstanding debt is A ,  so 
that  A G F Y s i s i s i s i , , , , − − = . Our approach in modeling the costs of adjusting the capital stock as a 
reduction in output follows Bond and Meghir; Jaramillio, Sciantarelli and Weiss. The cost of 
asymmetric information is also modeled as a reduction in the value of output. The argument for our approach is that both types of adjustments represents extraction’s of time, effort and resources that 
could have been better devoted to the farm enterprise. Regarding the cost of asymmetric 
information, an alternative way should have been to encapsulate such costs in a loan premium paid 
by the farm above the safe rate, see Jaramillio, Sciantarelli and Weiss (1996). A problem with the 
latter approach should be that it only captures the price responses to information asymmetries, 
which historically has been found to be small in the US agriculture (Barry, Baker and Sanit, 1981). 
More recent results by Miller et al. do however indicate the growing use of risk-adjusted and 
differential interest rates. Our approach is broader, potentially taking into account non-price 
responses such as security requirements and effects on output relating to loan maturities, loan 
supervision, and documentation. 
  The farm operator then maximizes (2) subject to (3) and (4) using outstanding debt, 
costlessly variable inputs and gross investment as control variables while the stock of capital is used 
as a state variable. Applying the discrete time maximum principle on the associated current value 
Lagrangian and substituting first order conditions for the costlessly adjustable inputs and gross 
investment into the state equation for capital yields the optimal capital accumulation condition 
(Euler) as 
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The first order condition (Euler) with respect to outstanding debt is 
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A P         ( 6 )    The left-hand side of eq. (5) represents the cost of postponing investment until the next-
coming period whereas the right hand side represents the costs of investing today. The cost of 
investing today consists of the marginal adjustment cost and the effective tax-adjusted purchasing 
cost of investment. The nominal acquisition value is reduced by the present value of fiscal 
allowances. The cost of waiting includes the foregone change in production, the marginal 
adjustment cost and the purchasing cost. 
  Equation (6) describes the conditions for a financial optimum in the farm firm, i.e. 
equalization of marginal cost across funds available for investment. The right-hand side of (6) 
describes the expected cost of equity and the left-hand side of (6) captures the expected cost of debt 
financing. If capital markets are perfect (i.e. absence of cost of financial adjustment) the cost of 
external funds equals the opportunity cost of equity. However, in presence of capital market 
imperfections a gap exists between the costs of funds. This gap, as recently noted by Barry, Bierlen 
and Sotomayor, is consistent with a pecking order of funds. The cost function for financial 
adjustment fills this gap and reflects lender’s response to informational asymmetries and assures the 
establishment of an internal financial optimum. Hence, the farm operator should chose funds for 
investment in period s so that he equalizes the opportunity rate of return on equity and the marginal 
cost of external funds. The latter consists of two parts. The first component is the expected after-tax 
cost of debt in next period. The second component is the incremental cost of adjusting outstanding 
debt. It should be noted that even in case of a cost-disadvantage for equity over debt the financial 
equilibrium will exist for sufficiently large investments since the cost function for financial 
adjustment is strictly increasing in the level of debt (see below). 
 
 Empirical specification 
The adjustment cost function in (5) represents additional costs to the farm enterprise when 
increasing (or decreasing) the capital stock. Adjustment costs based on the work by Eisner and 
Strotz; Lucas, imposing that changes in the quasi-fixed factor demands are smooth and symmetric, 
have shown to be substantial in farm size expansion (Vasavda & Chambers; Weersink & Tauer; 
Lopez; Thijssen). Recent research by Chang and Stefanou; Oude Lansink and Stefanou have 
developed a threshold model of adjustment costs, and provided empirical support for that 
adjustment may be faster when investment is contracting rather than expanding. 
Here, the basic specification of the adjustment cost follows Bond and Meghir; Withed and 
the adjustment cost function is assumed to be strictly convex and exogenously given by observable 
























α          ( 7 )  
where α is the adjustment cost constant parameter giving the magnitude. The location of symmetry 
equals the rate of capacity depreciationδ , stating that no adjustment cost prevails in steady state
1. It 
should be noted that (7) implies economies of scale in adjusting investment. The larger the farm is 
(measured by the capital stock), the less any given investment will displace resources (reduce 
output). 
  The cost function attributable to information asymmetries  () A .  captures the economic 
implications of adjusting the stock of external funds. The cost of information asymmetries is 
modeled as a continuous and differentiable convex function which increases in the amount of debt and decreases in the amount of capital and non-farm wealth so that  0 > AB ,  0 , < A A W K  and the 
second-order conditions    0 , , > A A A WW KK BB ,  0 , ,   < A A BW BK  (competitiveness) and  0 > AKW  
(complements). A parameterization that adheres to this specification is 
() () W K
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φ     (8) 
where φ ν  and  represents the constant magnitude parameter and the location of minimum costs of 
information asymmetries, respectively. 
The agency cost problems of adjusting the stock of external funds as captured by (8) relates 
both to the ex ante evaluation of investment and the farm operator as well as to the ex post 
monitoring of performance. The functional form of (8) implies a U-shaped agency cost curve 
defined as the sum of the positive (cost increasing) augmentation in external funds and the negative 
(cost decreasing) augmentation in the stocks of capital and non-farm wealth. In cases where farm 
assets for use as collateral is limited in supply or not sufficient, non-farm wealth may be used as a 
substitute since there is no clear-cut between business assets and private assets more than that 
attributed to the actual use in the proprietorship. 
The upward sloping part of the agency cost curve defined by (8) is from the ex ante 
perspective motivated adverse selection and moral hazard. The farm operator has private 
information about the chances of success of each investment project and the lender has to sort out 
viable investments and borrowers that will fulfill their contractual debt service but it is costly 
finding out. From the ex post perspective monitoring of performance or contractual control of 
outcomes and managerial actions represents costly state verification problems. If the ex post 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 If costs of adjusting the capital stock were supposed to be absent when no investment is undertaken, an alternative 
specification would have been (time and firm indexes suppressed) () () I K I G ν α 2 2 , − = ⋅ ⋅ . A problem with this monitoring is costly, or in the worst case impossible, the lender may not know the right time to take 
control of or to default a badly managed firm. Delays of this type may constitute considerable costs 
to both the lender and the borrower.  
The downward sloping part of the agency cost curve defined by (8) is motivated by the role 
of collateral as a way of hampering problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. It is well 
known from the Siglitz-Weiss model that the low-risk borrower by accepting collateral requirement 
credibly signal his status and thereby reduces the problems of adverse selection. Problems of moral 
hazard can also, following Bester, be reduced by the use of collateral as a bonding device. Bester 
points out that business owners may resist the provision of personal guarantee since such 
requirements if raised erodes limited liability status. This arguments is, however, not applicable for 
proprietary firms due to lack of limited liability and since there is no clear cut between business 
assets and private assets more that that attributable to the actual use in the proprietorship. The 
economic consequences of the non-limited liability status are at least twofold. First, since in fact 
non-farm collateral is implicitly used when a farmer offers collateral for a loan, the incentive to 
exert effort ought to be reinforced and problems of moral hazard ought to be reduced. Secondly, and 
at the other hand, when the farmer recognizes that personal collateral is asked for and used to secure 
loan applications his personal risk increases. One way to off-balance the risk, while still using debt 
is to invest in safer projects than else would have been motivated. In times of a changing productive 
environment, this off-balancing strategy could be hazardous to both the farmer and the lender in the 
long run and affecting the output negatively. In addition, the value or volume of either farm assets 
and non farm assets may be insufficient, particularly in instances where the lender rely on some 
forced liquidation value of the assets and not on their value in best use. Thus the asset illiquidity 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
functional form is however that there exists two roots, 2v and 0. value is of relevance in using collateral to secure loans. Conclusively, the downward sloping part 
balances the incentive (and cost reducing) effects of collateral against the discouraging effects. 
 
Data and summary statistics 
The data used to estimate the investment and financial Euler equations is based on Southwestern 
Minnesota Farm Business Management Association records. The time series initially collected 
covers the period 1989 through 1998 and includes 342 farm operations, only sole proprietors are 
included. The data were arranged in panel format. Since the data are analyzed in first differences 
using an instrumental method with time lags motivated that the shortest time period in the panel was 
set to four years following Arellano and Bond. That left the final panel to be constructed out of 
observations from 193 farm operations with a total of 1308 observations. The panel is unbalanced 
both in the sense that there is more observations on some farm than on others and because these 
observations corresponds to different points in time. 52 percent of the farm operations were 
represented in the panel for at least 7 years and the panel ranges over the 1990-1998 period. 
  Prices on 17 major commodities for Minnesota were collected from the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) in order to obtain an aggregated individual price index for 
each farm operation in the panel representing the individual price of output. It was not possible to 
construct a Tornqvist index due to missing information on quantities for some products. Instead a 
price index was constructed for each commodity. The individual total firm price index was then 
constructed by weighting the price index for each good. The share of sales of the each good in total 
sales represented the weights. 
  A firm specific aggregated price index for capital goods was constructed out of indexes of 
prices paid by U.S. farmers for livestock, farm machinery, farm buildings, and production items collected from USDA. In addition, a farm lands price index specific for the Southwestern Minnesota 
was collected from the Minnesota Agricultural Statistics Service. The aggregated farm specific price 
index was then constructed by weighting the price index for each good. The share of ending capital 
values for each asset in total ending asset value represented the weights. Assets valuations are based 
on a fair market value. 
  The Data Appendix provides a further detailed description of the variables used in the 
empirical analysis. Summary statistics for the variables and other farm characteristics are reported in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 Summary statistics for selected variables for 193 sole proprietorships in Southwestern 
Minnesota 1990-1998. 
 
Variable Mean    Median  Standard 
deviation 
K I s i s i , 1 , +   0.114 0.063  0.266 
() W K B s s s +   0.411 0.383  0.285 
K B s s   0.432 0.397  0.325 
K s s cf 1 +   0.137 0.125  0.301 
ECP (index)  1.282  1.233  0.372 
EPP (index)  1.041  0.985  0.339 
( ) z s i s i 1 , 1 , 1 + + − τ (%)  0.048 0.046  0.026 
r s i,  (%)  0.056 0.054  0.009 
K s  ($)  687.449 557.961  483.826 
W s  ($)  36.485 7.483  71.980 
Bs  ($)  266.040 214.677  238.569 
Notes: 
K s s cf 1 + = ( ) ( ) K L P w Y s s s p s s 1 1 , 1 1 + + + + − = (operating income minus operating expenses)/beginning value of capital 
stock. Used as a proxy for cash flow. 
ECP=() () P P s p s s K s , 1 , 1 1 1 τ − − + + Γ =effective price of capital/effective price received on products sold. 
EPP=()( ) P P s p s s p s , 1 , 1 1 1 τ τ − − + + = effective price received on products sold in period s+1/effective price received on 
products sold in period s. 
 
 
Table 2 reveals farm characteristics to allow the comparison of results across classes of firms and 
between groups of farm operators. Firms with these types of characteristics have been found in the 
financial constraint literature and in the recent literature on asymmetric costs of adjusting the capital stock to have different patterns of investment and financing behavior. These characteristics are the 
subsequently used to formulate dummy variables.  
Annual sales are used as a proxy for farm size and annual sales less than $150 000 is set to 
classify a small farm. Two competing characteristics, age of senior operator and years in farming for 
the senior operator, are used to capture differences in managerial styles and abilities. The investment 
dummy is invoked to test if costs of adjustment differ depending on if farm operations are in an 
investment regime or in a no investment regime. The dummy on new borrowing is invoked for 
similar reasons. In addition, three combined dummies are invoked. The first characterizes firms that 
are both investing and borrowing. The second represents small farms with a young operator and the 
third combined dummy variable is formed to characterize a currently investing small farm with a 
junior operator. The farm operations were also classified into three groups to identify a highly 
specialized production. The farms were identified as crop-, beef and dairy- or hog production by the 
requirement of having more than 60 percent of total sales in these categories. This sorting resulted in 
500 observations attributable to crop production, 140 observations for beef and dairy production, 
and 177 observations for hog production. 
 Table 2 Farm characteristics, share of total observations 
 
Characteristics share  (%) 
Annual sales < $150 000  0.22 
Senior operator age <40 years  0.29 
Years in farming for the senior operator<10 years  0.078 
Investment>0 0.79 
New borrowing  0.59 
Investment and new borrowing  0.52 
Annual sales <$150 000 and years in farming for senior 
operator<10 years 
0.03 
Investment>0, annual sales <$150 000 and years in 
farming for the senior operator<10 years 
0.023 
Cash flow to capital (cf/K) < 7%  0.20 
Non-farm wealth = 0  0.41 
 
A review of the Southwestern Minnesota Farm Business Management Association by Andersson 
and Olson revealed that the farm data collected are not representative of all farms in the area. Major 
differences existed in total tillable acreage, total cash sales, total operating expenses, and net farm 
income. Although their study only compared data for 1987 it signals that the panel analyzed here 
can be subject to misrepresentations. 
 
Econometric Specification and Results 
The dynamic Euler equations for investment and financing require estimation by the Generalized 
Methods of Moments estimator developed by Hansen and Singleton; Arelleano and Bond. This is 
motivated by the non-linearities in the investment equation and also since appropriately lagged 
instruments for endogenous explanatory variables are required. The results are generated using Ox 
version 2.20 (Doornik, 1999) and the DPD package version 1.00 (Doornik, Arelleano and Bond, 
1999).  
  In order to eliminate the firm-specific effect estimations are done in first-differences and 
then lagged instruments is used to fulfill the ortogonality requirement. Since instruments are 
selected out of lagged dependent variables with further lags on the same variables the assumption of no serial correlation in the error term is vital for the consistency of the estimators. The existence of 
serial correlation is tested for and if the error term is not serially correlated there should be evidence 
(with a negative sign) for first-order serial correlation but no evidence for second-order correlation 
in the first-differenced residuals (Arelleano and Bond 1998). In addition, the Sargan test for over-
identifying restrictions is calculated. This performs a joint test of the model specification and the 
validity of the instruments (i.e. it tests if the moments are fulfilled) under the desirable null 
hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions hold. The Sargan test is chi-square distributed with as 
many degrees of freedom as overidentifying restrictions. 
  The Wald test reported is a test for the joint significance of the regressors and a separate 
Wald test is reported when time effects are included to reveal the significance of time dynamics. 
The Wald tests are also chi-square distributed with as many degrees of freedom as variables tested. 
 
The investment equation 
An estimable capital accumulation relationship is obtained in three steps. First, with the benefit of 
not having to specify a parametric form of the production function the net marginal output in the 
left-hand side of (5) is substituted according to the Euler Theorem
2. This approach follows Bond 
and Meghir; Jaramillio, Schiantarelli and Weiss. Secondly, the partial derivative of the production 
function with respect to the costlessly adjustable input is replaced by the first-order condition 
P p w L F = ∂ ∂ . The final step is to incorporate the partial derivatives of the adjustment cost function 
as well as the cost function attributable to information asymmetries. Using the rational expectations 
assumption expected values are replaced by actual values and a serially uncorrelated forecast error 
e s i 1 , +  so that the Euler equation for capital becomes (firm index suppressed): 
                                                            









































































































































































































































   (9) 
where  t f   and   represents fixed effects and time effects, respectively. 
 
  Table 3 show the results for estimating various versions of the Euler equation (9). Three 
structural parameters are recovered: α , the quadratic adjustment cost parameter; φ, the quadratic 
parameter capturing the level of the agency cost function, and ν, the debt to capital and non-farm 
wealth ratio that provides the location of minimum costs attributable to agency problems and 
information asymmetries. The set of instruments includes the regressors as well as dummy variables 
lagged two periods.  
  The analysis presented is sequential. In column (a) time effects are included when estimating 
(9). The inclusion of time effects improves the fit of the model and the Wald statistics support the 
inclusion of time dummies. Time dummies for 1994, 1997 and 1998 were significant at the five 
percent level (1994) and at the one percent level (1997, 1998) with negative signs indicating that the 
farms represented in the sample exhibited a lower investment to capital ration during these years. 
Time effects were therefore allowed for in the subsequent versions. In column (b) a dummy was 
included to identify farms with positive levels of investment. In column (c) an interactive dummy is 
included to identify farm that both invest and increase borrowing. In column (d) an interactive 
dummy variable is included to identify small farm operations with a younger farm operator. Finally, in column (e) a dummy variable is included to identify small farms with a young farm operator that 
has a positive level of investment. 
 
Table 3. Estimates of investment equation (9), (sample period 1990-1998) 
 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
α 































































































*** Indicates statistical significance at the one percent level 
** Indicates statistical significance at the five percent level 
* Indicates statistical significance at the ten percent level 
Notes: ( St. dev) - standard deviation. W(1) - Wald test of joint significance of regressors. W(time) - test of joint 
significance of time dummies. Sargan - test of overidentifying restrictions and model specification. AR(1) and AR(2) - 
tests for first (1) and second (2) order correllation in the residuals. 
 
  For all cases represented in Table 3 the estimated values of the adjustment cost parameter a 
is highly significant and low but fairly reasonable. Hubbard and Kashyap reports a value of a about 
1.05 on equipment investment in the U. S. agricultural sector. Withed reports a value of 2.026 for 
large industrial firms. The economic significance of this parameter can be seen from eq. (7). Since 
the rate of economic depreciation (equal to the ratio of investment to capital that minimizes the cost 
of adjustment) is assumed to be 6 percent a value of α− value equal to 0.884 implies that adjustment 
costs will be 2.4% of investment expenditures for a farm that invests $102 000 on a capital stock of 
$ 680 000.   The value of α  in column (b) are slightly discouraging and indicates that farms in an 
expanding regime have lower costs of adjustment compared to farms that have zero or negative 
investment ratios. Oude Lansink and Sefanou found that the adjustment rate is higher in the 
contracting regime than in the expanding regime for a set of specialized Dutch cash crop farms. 
Although, by including the interacting effect of new borrowing and positive levels of investment 
column (c) then reveals a higher α  compared to column (b). This could indicate that a higher 
adjustment cost in expansion is triggered by the acquisition of funds for investment. Also, the α -
values in columns (e) and (f) suggests that the costs of adjustment is higher for small farms with a 
young operator and highest for small farms with a young operator that are in an expanding regime. It 
should however be noted that the estimated α -values remain in the same 95 percent confidence 
interval so that the interpretation of differences between them may only be tentative. 
  The results in Table 3 also suggests that agency problems and information asymmetries 
lowers the level of output. The level of the agency cost function is significant at the 10 percent level 
and the estimated values for the level parameter exceeds the α -parameter. This is a notable result 
indicating that output is more hampered by capital market imperfections than by costs of installing 
new capital. According to (7) a value of φ  equal to 1.33 means gives for a farm that chooses a debt 
to capital and non-farm ratio deviating 10 percentage units from the location of the minimal agency 
cost incurs a loss/gain of $4522 if the stock of capital and non-farm wealth amounts to $680 000. 
The implied estimate for φ is higher for farms that rises debt and invests, have low incomes and a 
younger farm operator, and is highest for expanding farms with low incomes and a younger 
operator. 
  The debt to capital and non-farm wealth location of minimum costs differs across the cases 
revealed in Table 3, as one would expect, although the effect is not significant. A cautious interpretation (t-value = 0.744) suggest that farms in an expansion regime of investment and 
borrowing should chose higher debt levels as compared to other farms in order to lower the costs of 
capital market imperfections. One explanation to this could be a larger availability of assets suitable 
as collateral. Columns (d) and (e) also suggest that small farm with a less experienced operator 
should have a lower debt to capital and non-farm wealth ratio as compared to other farms. The t-
values in column (d) and (e) are 0.465 and 0.549, respectively. Along another line of research 
Bierlen and Featherstone reports that the debt level was the strongest determinant of credit 
constraint for younger farm operators (age<41 years). Our results is therefore reasonable. 
  The Euler equation (9) was also estimated by including dummy variables to identify highly 
specialized production units. The estimation for crop farms (not shown) yielded highly insignificant 
α  and φ-values, although the ν parameter was significant at the 10 percent level. The Wald (joint) 
and Sargan statistics supported the specification. The p-values for those statistics were 0.00 and 
0.479, respectively. This suggests that adjustment costs are less important for specialized crop farm 
as compared to other types of farms. We were not able to do similar estimations for farm specialized 
in beef and dairy, and hog production due to singular instrumental matrixes. 
  Finally, tests was done to check weather a low cash flow to capital ratio (cf/K<0.07), absence 
of non-farm wealth (W = 0) or a low operator age (age<40 years) could be significant in estimating 
eq. (9). The tests confirmed that neither of these characteristics were significant. Although, among 
them a low cash flow was the one most significant (p-value = 0.243). 
The financial equation 
An estimable financial Euler equation is obtain from (6) by substituting the partial derivatives of (8) 
with respect to borrowing and by replacing expected values with actual values and a forecast error 
so that (firm index suppressed): ()                                                                              1 1 1 , 1 , 1 1 e z
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where  t f   and   represents fixed effects and time effects, respectively. 
 
Table 4 shows the result for estimating various versions of the Euler equation (10). The 
effective after tax interest rate was used as the dependent variable and two structural parameters φ 
and ν is recovered. The set of instruments included the regressors as well as B/(K+W), I/K and cf/K 
and additional dummies. Each instrument is lagged two and three periods. The one-step estimation 
of equation (10) provided only weak support for the model. The Sargan statistic was 62.54 for 53 
degrees of freedom. The estimation was therefore done by the two-step heteroskedasticity consistent 
procedure. 
Column (a) reveals the results obtained when estimating (10) without time effects. Time 
effects were rejected by the Wald statistics in a separate estimation (not shown) and are therefore 
left out of consideration in the following. In column (b) a dummy is included to identify farms that 
raises new debt and invests. In column (c) a dummy is included to identify farm operators younger 
than 40 years and in column (d) a dummy is included to identify farm operators with less than 10 
years of experience in farming. Column (e) then represents small farms with less experienced farm 
operators. Column (f) finally reveals the results for small farms with less experienced farm operators 
that raises new debt and invests. Table 4. Estimates of financial equation (10), (sample period 1990-1998) 
 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 















































































*** Indicates statistical significance at the one percent level 
Notes: W(1) - Wald test of joint significance of regressors. W(time) - test of joint significance of time dummies. Sargan 
- test of overidentifying restrictions and model specification. AR(1) and AR(2) - tests for first (1) and second (2) order 
correllation in the residuals. 
 
The results shown in Table 4 strongly support the hypothesis that agency problems and 
information asymmetries affect the capital structure. A value of φ around 0.024 implies that 
adjustment costs due to agency problems and information asymmetries is less affective to financial 
decisions as compared to capital accumulation decisions. The agency cost level parameter is higher 
for small farms with less experienced farm operators (column (e)), and also for the sample of small 
farms with less experienced farmers that are expanding their business (column (f)). 
In relation to Table 3 we now find that the estimates of the ν-parameter, the debt to capital 
and non-farm equity that minimizes the agency costs, is significant at the one percent level except in 
column (e) were a p-value of 0.244 is obtained. The suggested levels of the minimum location 
reported in columns (e) and (f) again implies that it is optimal for farms/farmers that a priori is 
expected to face problems of costs and availability of credit to have a lower level of indebtedness. 
Although columns (c) and (d) in Table 4 reflects the same thing in form of farmer 
characteristic, young operator or less experienced operator, the estimated location of minimum 
agency costs differs. A comparison stresses that less experience in farming is more suggestive for a lower indebtedness than the age of the operator. Again, in lack of other studies we can not 
generalize this finding. 
  The Euler equation (10) was also estimated by including dummy variables to identify highly 
specialized production units. The estimation for crop farms (not shown) yielded significant φ- and ν-
parameter values but the ν-value is unreasonably large (around 2.57). The Wald (dummy) test was 
significant at the one percent level but the AR(1) test rejected the existence of first-order serial 
correlation. We were not able to do similar estimations for farm specialized in beef and dairy, and 
hog production due to singular instrumental matrixes. 
  Finally, neither a low cash flow to capital ratio (cf/K<0.07) nor absence of non-farm wealth 
(W = 0) were significant in eq. (10). Although, a low cash flow was the one most significant factor 
(p-value = 0.50). The result that farms with low cash flows does not seems to differ in respect to 
agency costs in relation to farms with higher cash flow is surprising in light of the positive effect of 
cash flows in resolving asymmetric information reported by Jensen, Lawson and Langemeier. 
 
Concluding comments 
This paper has provided a new theory for an endogenous capital structure for the proprietor farm in 
the presence of asymmetric information and agency problems in the lender-borrower relationship by 
introducing a financial agency cost function. In the financial optimum internal and external funds 
(i.e. debt) are chosen so that the cost of internal funds equals the after-tax cost of debt and the 
marginal agency cost. The optimal leverage is not at the minimum level of agency cost but rather 
were the positive and negative effects of informational symmetries fills the gap between costs of 
equity and debt.   The empirical results supports the theory and reveals supportive evidence for that costs of 
asymmetric information and agency problem affects the capital accumulation decisions as well as 
capital structure decisions. 
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 Data Appendix 
 
Variable Description 
is I ,   Real gross investment. Includes purchases of breeding livestock, 
machinery and farm equipment, other interim assets, farm 
buildings, farmland, and other long-term farm assets. Includes 
changes in inventories for livestock and crop and feed. 
ps s PY ,   Value of total sales. Equals cash farm income minus patronage 
dividends, insurance income, and cash from hedging. 
ss wL  Variable costs. Equals cash farm expenses minus interest, 
personal property taxes, and hedging account deposits. 
s B   Book value of total loan liabilities. 
s z   Effective interest rate on debt. Defined as cash interest expenses 
divided by the annual average of the book value of beginning total 
liabilities, ending total liabilities and borrowed current liabilities. 
s W   Personal wealth. Includes non-farm savings, stocks and bonds and 
real estate. 
s K   Value of capital stock at fair market value. Includes breeding 
livestock, machinery and farm equipment, other interim assets, 
farm buildings, farmland, and other long-term farm assets. 
Includes growing crops, crops and feed and market livestock 
s r   Opportunity rate of return on equity. Based on 10-year Treasury 
Constant Maturity Bonds. Moving 5-year average of annual yields 
calculated by weighting monthly data. Data obtained from 
www.econmagic.com. 
s τ   Marginal tax rates on farm income. Includes federal income tax, 
self-employment tax and state income tax. Calculated for each 
firm and year. 
e τ   Effective marginal tax rate on equity. Calculated for each firm 
and year as the alternative tax obligation obtained by multiplying 
farm net worth by the market portfolio return. 
Γ s  Present value of fiscal allowances. Calculated for each firm and 
year as a weighted index using share of purchased capital assets in 
total investment excluding inventory adjustment as weights.  
1 D   Dummy variable. If crop farm, then  1 D =1, else 0. 
2 D   Dummy variable. If small farm, then  2 D =1, else 0. 
3 D   Dummy variable. If new long-term debt, then  3 D =1, else 0. 
4 D   Dummy variable. If senior operator age<40, then  4 D =1, else 0. 
5 D   Dummy variable. If years in farming<10, then  5 D =1, else 0. 
 
 